ORDER MO-4645

Appeal MA22-00748

York Regional Police Services Board

April 17, 2025

Summary: The appellant made a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act  for all police records relating to him. The police granted partial access to a five-page report, withholding some information because its disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual’s personal privacy (section 38(b)) and other information because it is not responsive to the request.

In this order, the adjudicator upholds the police’s decision in part. She finds that the police properly withheld another individual’s personal information under section 38(b). She also finds that the police properly withheld some of the information they identified as non-responsive. However, she finds that other information that the police withheld as non-responsive is responsive to the request and orders them to issue an access decision with respect to that information.

Statutes Considered: Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56 , as amended, sections 2(1) (definition of “personal information”), 14(2)(f), 14(3)(b), 17, and 38(b).

OVERVIEW:

[1] This order determines whether the York Regional Police Services Board (the police) properly withheld information that was identified as not responsive to the request from a police record. It also determines whether the disclosure of personal information from that record would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 38 (b) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act  (the Act ).

[2] The requester made the following request pursuant to the Act :

Complete records of police regarding [the requester] on Oct. 13, 2022 while attending [his] lawyers new office. Any and all other records regarding [the requester]. Any and all records of private investigators who have attended in front of [his] parents home. Any and all records of information shared to YRPS regarding [the requester] by any doctor.

[3] The police granted partial access to a five-page report, citing the discretionary exemption at section 38(b) (personal privacy) to deny access to the remaining information.

[4] The requester, now the appellant, appealed the police’s decision to the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC).

[5] During mediation, the police clarified that while some of the information in the record was withheld under section 38(b), other information was withheld as it was considered non-responsive to the request. The appellant took issue with the police’s application of the exemption as well as their decision to withhold information deemed non-responsive.

[6] As mediation did not resolve the appeal, the file was transferred to the adjudication stage of the appeal process, where an adjudicator may conduct an inquiry under the Act .

[7] The adjudicator originally assigned to the appeal sought and received representations from the police and the appellant. The appeal was subsequently transferred to me to complete the inquiry and issue a decision.

[8] After reviewing the parties’ representations, I determined that I did not need to hear from the parties further before issuing this decision.

[9] For the reasons that follow, I uphold the police’s decision in part. I uphold the police’s decision to withhold portions of the record under section 38(b) and some of the information as non-responsive. However, I find that some of the information that the police identified as non-responsive is responsive to the request and order them to issue an access decision with respect to that information.

RECORDS:

[10] The record at issue is a general occurrence report (pages 2-5 in the records package provided to the appellant).[1] Pages 2-4 of the general occurrence report were disclosed in part, while page 5 was disclosed in full.

ISSUES:

1. What information is responsive to the request?
2. Does the record contain “personal information” as defined in section 2(1) and, if so, whose personal information is it?
3. Does the discretionary personal privacy exemption at section 38(b) apply to the information at issue?
4. Did the police properly exercise their discretion in withholding the information in the record?

DISCUSSION:

Issue A: What information is responsive to the request?

[11] The police withheld two Master Name Summaries (appearing on pages 2 and 3), a Master Vehicle Summary (page 3), and a number appearing beside the “Initial Officer Report” heading (page 4) as non-responsive to the appellant’s request.

[12] Section 17  of the Act  imposes certain obligations on requesters and institutions when submitting and responding to requests for access to records. This section states, in part:

(1) A person seeking access to a record shall,

(a) make a request in writing to the institution that the person believes has custody or control of the record, and specify that the request is being made under this Act ;

(b) provide sufficient detail to enable an experienced employee of the institution, upon a reasonable effort, to identify the record;

. . .

(2) If the request does not sufficiently describe the record sought, the institution shall inform the applicant of the defect and shall offer assistance in reformulating the request so as to comply with subsection (1).

[13] To be considered responsive to the request, records must “reasonably relate” to the request.[2] Institutions should interpret requests liberally, in order to best serve the purpose and spirit of the Act . Generally, ambiguity in the request should be resolved in the requester’s favour.[3]

Representations

[14] The police submit that the Master Name Summary and Master Vehicle Summary are considered “live records” that can change at any time, and that the number appearing beside the “Initial Officer Report” heading is administrative. The police indicate that none of this information is related to the investigation or to the police’s interaction with the appellant.

[15] The police submit that based on the appellant’s request for “any and all records”, they searched their Records Management System (RMS) for all available interactions with the appellant for the period of 2005 to the date of the request. According to the police, this search included but was not limited to general occurrence reports, calls, and tickets. The police submit that the appellant’s request included enough detail for them to identify the responsive records.

[16] The appellant provided lengthy representations in which he describes his experiences with law enforcement and the justice system. I have reviewed and considered the entirety of the appellant’s representations and will discuss them where relevant. The appellant does not reference the issue of responsiveness in his representations.

Analysis and findings

[17] I have considered the police’s limited representations on this issue and conclude that I do not have enough evidence to find that the Master Name Summary and the Master Vehicle Summary are non-responsive to the appellant’s request for any and all records relating to him. However, I agree with the police’s decision to withhold the number appearing beside the “Initial Officer Report” heading as non-responsive to the appellant’s request and provide my reasoning below.

[18] First, I find that the Master Name Summary and Master Vehicle Summary contain information about the appellant, the affected party, and the vehicle that the appellant was seen in. In my view, this is information which, on its face, appears to relate to the appellant’s relatively broad request for “any and all records” relating to him. Additionally, although the police characterize the Master Name Summary and Master Vehicle Summary as “live records” that can change at any time, they do not explain how this characterization is relevant to the issue of responsiveness. While the implication is that the changeability of this information renders it non-responsive, the police do not provide any information about why these changes might occur or what the changes might be. The mere possibility that the Master Name Summary and Master Vehicle Summary could change, without more, is not a sufficient basis for me to conclude that the information which presently appears in the record is non-responsive to the appellant’s request.

[19] Second, I have reviewed the records and find that the Master Name Summary on page 2 is composed of information which the police already disclosed in an earlier section of the same page. The Master Name Summary and the Master Vehicle Summary on page 3 also contain certain information which the police disclosed in other sections of the general occurrence report. I find that the police’s representations do not adequately explain why information is considered non-responsive to the request when it appears under the Master Name Summary and Master Vehicle Summary, while the same information appearing in other sections of the report has been identified as responsive and disclosed to the appellant.

[20] For these reasons, I conclude that the Master Name Summary and Master Vehicle Summary are responsive to the appellant’s request. Below, I will order the police to issue an access decision on the Master Name Summary on page 2, which consists of information that the police disclosed in an earlier section of the same page. I also order the police to issue an access decision on those portions of the Master Name Summary and Master Vehicle Summary on page 3 which consist of information that the police disclosed in earlier sections of the general occurrence report.

[21] Finally, the police also withheld a number appearing beside the “Initial Officer Report” heading on page 4 as non-responsive to the request. Although the police do not provide representations on what this number means or what administrative function it serves, I accept that this extremely limited information does not reasonably relate to the appellant’s request. I uphold the police’s decision to withhold this number as non-responsive.

Issue B: Does the record contain “personal information” as defined in section 2(1) and, if so, whose personal information is it?

[22] Before I consider whether section 38(b) applies, I must first determine whether the record contains “personal information”. If it does, I must determine whether the personal information belongs to the appellant, the affected party, or both.

[23] It is important to know whose personal information is in the record. If the record contains the requester’s own personal information, their access rights are greater than if it does not.[4] Additionally, if the record contains the personal information of other individuals, one of the personal privacy exemptions might apply.[5]

[24] Section 2(1)  of the Act  defines “personal information” as “recorded information about an identifiable individual”. Recorded information is information recorded in any form, including paper and electronic records.[6]

[25] Information is “about” an individual when it refers to them in their personal capacity, meaning that it reveals something of a personal nature about that individual. Information is about an “identifiable individual” if it is reasonable to expect that an individual can be identified from the information either by itself or if combined with other information.[7] Section 2(1)  of the Act  contains some examples of personal information, though this list is not exhaustive. Therefore, information that does not fall under paragraphs (a) to (h) may still qualify as personal information.

Representations

[26] The police submit that the record contains the personal information of the appellant and another individual (affected party). The police indicate that they denied access to the affected party’s personal information, which includes their sex, date of birth, address, and vehicle information. The police submit that affected party is identifiable from this information, particularly because other information about them (i.e. their name) was disclosed to the appellant. The appellant does not explicitly comment on whose personal information is in the record.

Analysis and findings

[27] I have reviewed the record and find that it contains both the appellant’s and the affected party’s personal information as defined by section 2(1)  of the Act , including information relating to the age or sex of the individual (paragraph (a) of the definition of personal information in section 2(1)), addresses (paragraph (d)), and limited information about the affected party’s vehicle (paragraph (c)). The affected party is identifiable from the information in the record, and this information is personal in nature.

[28] Having found that the record contains the personal information of both the appellant and the affected party, I will consider the application of the personal privacy exemption at section 38(b) to the information remaining at issue, which appears on page 2 (one redacted line), page 3 (eight redacted lines), and page 4 (one single redaction) of the general occurrence report.

Issue C: Does the discretionary personal privacy exemption at section 38(b) apply to the information at issue?

[29] Section 36(1)  of the Act  gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by an institution. Section 38 provides some exemptions from this right.

[30] Under the section 38(b) exemption, if a record contains the personal information of both the requester and another individual, the institution may refuse to disclose the other individual’s personal information to the requester if disclosing that information would be an “unjustified invasion” of the other individual’s personal privacy.

[31] The section 38(b) exemption is discretionary. This means that the institution can decide to disclose the other individual’s personal information to the requester even if doing so would result in an unjustified invasion of the other individual’s personal privacy.

[32] If disclosing another individual’s personal information would not be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, then the information is not exempt under section 38(b).

[33] Sections 14(1) to (4) provide guidance in determining whether the disclosure would be an unjustified invasion of the other individual’s personal privacy:

• If any of the section 14(1)(a) to (e) exceptions apply, disclosure is not an unjustified invasion of personal privacy and the information is not exempt from disclosure under section 38(b).
• Section 14(2) contains a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be relevant in determining whether the disclosure of personal information would be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Some of the factors weigh in favour of disclosure, while others weigh against disclosure.
• Section 14(3) lists circumstances where disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.
• Section 14(4) lists circumstances where disclosure of personal information is not an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, even if one of the section 14(3) presumptions exists.

[34] The parties do not rely on any of the section 14(1)(a) to (e) exceptions or on section 14(4) and I find that they do not apply in this appeal.

[35] To determine whether disclosure of the withheld information in the records would be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 38(b), I must therefore consider and weigh the relevant factors and presumptions in sections 14(2) and (3) and balance the interests of the parties.[8]

Representations

[36] The police submit that they compiled the affected party’s personal information as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, therefore engaging the presumption at section 14(3)(b). The police explain that an officer observed an individual slumped over in a vehicle and approached to investigate a possible provincial and criminal violation, or alternatively to conduct a wellness check. The police indicate that the affected party was the registered owner of the vehicle, and that they obtained their personal information from a motor vehicle check, not from the appellant. The police state that the affected party was never spoken to.

[37] The appellant does not provide substantive representations on the section 14(2) factors or the section 14(3) presumptions. However, the appellant provides a detailed timeline of the events leading to the incident set out in the general occurrence report. The appellant states that in 2009, he was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident which left him with catastrophic injuries and cognitive difficulties, rendering him unable to live independently. The appellant describes his attempts to seek compensation over multiple years and indicates that in the process, multiple individuals have caused him additional suffering and irreparable psychological and emotional damage. For example, the appellant alleges that members of the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) committed numerous violations of the Police Services Act and the Criminal Code , and that his former counsel committed fraud in order to deprive him of his entitlements.

Analysis and findings

[38] For the reasons below, I find that disclosure of the personal information that has been withheld from the report would constitute an unjustified invasion of the affected party’s personal privacy and therefore, this information is exempt under section 38(b).

Do any of the presumptions listed in 14(3) apply?

[39] The police claim that the section 14(3)(b) presumption against disclosure applies to the information at issue. Section 14(3)(b) states:

A disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified violation of personal privacy if the personal information,

was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation[.]

[40] Even if no criminal proceedings were commenced against an individual, as is the case in this appeal, section 14(3)(b) may still apply. The presumption only requires that there be an investigation into a possible violation of law.[9]

[41] I have reviewed the report and find that the withheld personal information was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law. The report is about the police’s investigation into the appellant’s presence in a motor vehicle, which was stopped in a public parking lot. The officer subsequently conducted a motor vehicle check and obtained the personal information of the affected party, who was the registered owner of the vehicle.

[42] The police’s investigation into this incident gave rise to the possibility of criminal charges being laid. As the presumption only requires that there be an investigation into a possible violation of law, the fact that no criminal proceedings were initiated does not alter my finding.

[43] As a result, I am satisfied that section 14(3)(b) applies and that disclosure of the personal information in the record is presumed to be an unjustified invasion of the affected party’s personal privacy.

[44] Under section 38(b), the section 14(3)(b) presumption must be weighed and balanced with any other factors in section 14(2) that apply in the circumstances.

Do any of the factors listed in section 14(2) apply?

[45] Section 14(2) lists factors that may be relevant in determining whether disclosure of personal information would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Some factors weigh in favour of disclosure, while others weigh against disclosure.

[46] The police submit that none of the section 14(2) factors apply to the personal information in the record.

[47] The appellant does not reference any of the section 14(2) factors in his representations. However, the appellant discusses his numerous grievances against other parties, including the OPP and his former legal representatives. For completeness, I will therefore consider whether the factor at section 14(2)(d) (fair determination of rights) applies and weighs in favour of disclosure.

[48] Section 14(2)(d) requires an institution to consider whether “the personal information is relevant to a fair determination of rights affecting the person who made the request”.[10] In order for the section 14(2)(d) factor to apply, the appellant must establish all four parts of the following test:

1. the right in question is a legal right which is drawn from the concepts of common law or statute law, as opposed to a non-legal right based solely on moral or ethical grounds; and
2. the right is related to a proceeding which is either existing or contemplated, not one which has already been completed; and
3. the personal information which the appellant is seeking access to has some bearing on or is significant to the determination of the right in question; and
4. the personal information is required in order to prepare for the proceeding or to ensure an impartial hearing.[11]

[49] I am not satisfied that all four parts of the test have been met. Although the appellant references his participation in both civil and criminal proceedings, these proceedings appear to have been completed, rather than existing or contemplated. Additionally, while the appellant identifies numerous individuals throughout his representations, the affected party is not one of them. As the affected party does not seem to be in any way related to the appellant’s grievances, I am not convinced that their personal information is required in order to prepare for a proceeding or to ensure an impartial hearing.

[50] As a result, I find that the factor at section 14(2)(d) is not relevant and does not favour disclosure of the personal information in the circumstances of this appeal.

[51] The police have expressly indicated that none of the 14(2) factors apply, and the appellant does not raise any in his representations. I have also considered whether any other factors, including unlisted factors, apply to weigh in favour of disclosure and find that none do.

Balancing the relevant presumption and factors

[52] I have found that disclosure of the affected party’s personal information would result in a presumed unjustified invasion of their personal privacy under section 14(3)(b).

[53] The police have expressly indicated that none of the section 14(2) factors apply. I have also considered whether any of the section 14(2) factors, listed or unlisted, apply to weigh in favour of or against disclosure, and find that none do.

[54] Overall, I find that the balance weighs in favour of protecting the affected party’s personal privacy, rather than the appellant’s access rights. As a result, I find that the personal information at issue is exempt from disclosure under section 38 (b) of the Act .

Absurd result

[55] An institution may not be able to rely on the section 38(b) exemption where the requester originally supplied the information in the record or is otherwise aware of the information contained in the record. In these cases, withholding the information might be absurd and inconsistent with the purpose of the exemption.[12] This is referred to as the absurd result principle.

[56] The police submit that the absurd result principle does not apply in this case as they obtained the affected party’s personal information by running a motor vehicle check, and not from the appellant. The police submit that in the circumstances, it is not absurd to assume that the appellant does not have knowledge of the personal information at issue. The appellant does not comment on the extent of his knowledge of the information in the record or his relationship with the affected party.

[57] Based on my review of the record, I find that the absurd result principle does not apply. Previous IPC orders have found that the absurd result principle may not apply if disclosure is inconsistent with the purpose of the exemption, even if the information is otherwise known to the requester.[13]

[58] It is unclear what, if anything, the appellant knows about the affected party. Considering the lack of information that is before me, any conclusions that I draw about this would amount to speculation. Given my earlier finding that disclosure would be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, I find that to apply the absurd result principle would be inconsistent with the purpose of the section 38(b) exemption.

[59] As a result, I find that it would not be absurd to withhold the personal information of the affected party in the circumstances of this appeal.

Issue D: Did the police properly exercise their discretion in withholding the information in the record?

[60] The section 38(b) exemption is discretionary and permits an institution to disclose information, despite the fact that it could withhold it. Having found that portions of the record are exempt from disclosure under section 38(b), I must next determine if the police properly exercised their discretion in withholding the information. An institution must exercise its discretion. On appeal, the IPC may determine whether an institution has failed to do so.

[61] The IPC may find that an institution erred in exercising its discretion where, for example,

• it does so in bad faith or for an improper purpose;
• it takes into account irrelevant considerations; or
• it fails to take into account relevant considerations.

[62] In either case, the IPC may send the matter back to the institution for an exercise of discretion based on proper considerations.[14] The IPC may not, however, substitute its own discretion for that of the institution.[15]

Representations, analysis and finding

[63] The police submit that they relied on a number of factors when exercising their discretion to withhold the affected party’s personal information from the report, including but not limited to the purpose of the Act and nature of the information at issue. The police submit that they granted access to as much of the record as possible, and that the only information that was not disclosed to the appellant was the affected party’s personal identifiers, such as their sex, date of birth, address, and vehicle information (including associated license plate). The appellant did not address the police’s exercise of discretion in his representations.

[64] I have reviewed the considerations relied upon by the police and find that they properly exercised their discretion in withholding portions of the report under section 38(b). Based on the police’s representations, it is clear that they considered the purposes of the Act and sought to balance the appellant’s interest in accessing the entire record with the protection of the affected party’s privacy when making their decision.

[65] I find that the police did not exercise their discretion to withhold portions of the report in bad faith or for any improper purpose, and that there is no evidence that they failed to take relevant factors into account or considered irrelevant factors. Accordingly, I uphold the police’s exercise of discretion in denying access to the information at issue.

ORDER:

1. I uphold the police’s decision in part.
2. I order the police to issue an access decision to the appellant for the Master Name Summary on page 2 and those portions of the Master Name Summary and Master Vehicle Summary on page 3 that have been otherwise disclosed, treating the date of this order as the date of the request for the purposes of the procedural requirements of the Act .
3. In order to verify compliance with order provision 1, I order the police to provide me with a copy of their decision by May 21, 2025.
4. I reserve the right to require the police to provide me with a copy of any records disclosed to the appellant as a result of order provision 1.

Original Signed by:		April 17, 2025
Anda Wang
Adjudicator